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PREFACE

The world in which we

live is constantly changing.

We are fortunate enough to live in a free society, where
new ideas are

welcomed and nourished,

finally accepted or rejected.
frequent,

then tested,

and

Change here in America is

and considered a necessary part of the continuing

evolution of our Nation.

But a dynamic society produces

an obligation upon its members to stay constantly informed
of changes and trends,

not only in our personal areas of

expertise,

aspects

but

in all

of

the world around us.

While no one can hope to stay completely informed of all
fields
can,

of knowledge affecting his life,

with some effort,

the more studious

remain aware of the most signif-

icant trends and patterns in his fields of interest.
As a

student of business and management,

one of my

deeper interests is in the legal environment in which the
American business person must operate.

As one of the corner-

stones of our society, the free enterprise system encourages
and respects creative approaches to both new and old problems.

New ideas,

of our society.

if accepted,

continue the development

Free enterprise gives to all the chance
vii

to succeed,
equal

but the right to succeed carries with it an

right to fail.

where,

This

is true in business as else-

where successful businesses create profits,

expand

and mature, while unsuccessful businesses wither and die.
This winnowing process is touted as one of the great
strengths of our society, the end product being the distribution of the greatest amount of resourses to the greatest
amount of people.

However, a strict Darwinian survival-of-

the-fittest process would mean simply grow or die.
business people do not operate in such a

Our

social vacuum,

and our policies are tempered by another of our society's
great strengths:

compassion.

In the business world,

this

compassion is manifested by the addition of a safety net
to the right to fail
The

-

that is the right to begin again.

laws of bankruptcy are intended to administratively

support the inevitable failures by mandating an orderly
process by which unsuccessful businesses are dissolved,
but only after they are given every possible opportunity
to change,

recover and prosper once again.

A business

that is in a poor financial condition is to be protected
during its convalescent period in hopes that it may once
again be successful and contribute to the overall well-being
of society.

viii

ABSTRACT

CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION:
CREATIVE MANAGEMENT
OR
AN ABUSE OF THE SYSTEM?

William Rush Zilliott
The University of North Dakota Graduate Center, 1984
Faculty Advisor: Orville Goulet

Recent developments within the Bankruptcy Court system
are controversial.

Several of the

largest corporations

in the United States are currently undergoing reorganization.

To some companies, Chapter 11 is the only way out

of staggering debt,

to others Chapter 11 is a means to

stall liability suits, and to still others Chapter 11 represents a way to force wage concessions in the place of honoring union contracts.

The entire Bankruptcy Court system

itself has been successfully challenged as being Unconsititutional, and continues to operate only by a special dispensation from Congress.
When these developments are placed in an historical
context,

they point to a critical period in the evolution

of bankruptcy law.

Observant reporters of the business

world have followed the more important cases in Chapter
ix

11,

and have written about them extensively in magazines,

The Wall Street Journal and in legal textbooks.

This paper

consolidates that information, organizing the more pertinent
facts

in a

manner that facilitates

the bankruptcy system.

an understanding of

Three cases are examined and their

impact upon American business law is put in perspective.
Chapter 11 Reorganization represents

a way for society

to balance the need for continuing employment against the
need to protect creditors' rights.

But the manner in which

certain corporations are taking advantage of the provisions
of Chapter 11 begs the question:
mentor an abuse of the system?
of both.

X

Is this creative manageThe answer is a

little

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1

ORIENTATION

The subject of this paper is the process of reorganization of insolvent businesses.

Chapter 11 is the specific

section of the Federal Bankruptcy Code dealing with the
convalescent period of an ailing business.
a
as

It provides

certain degree of sheltering of the business as well
for

the orderly process by which attempts are made to

restructure and regain strength.
This

area of business

law is

fascinating because

of its current impact on very fundamental aspects of the
business community.
11 have

Recent developments within Chapter

altered traditional

management.

balances between labor and

The redress of injured workers against indus-

trial manufacturers of hazardous materials is profoundly
affected by another development in this

field,

and the

bankruptcy court system itself is presently being challenged.

Bankruptcy

law is young as legal principles go,

and its maturation process is a continual evolution.

The

impact of bankruptcy law has never been more strongly felt
as during the current period,

and its evolution is certain

to provide a greater impact in the future.
2

3

1.2

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The objectives of this paper are to
recent developments in Bankruptcy Law ter 11 Reorganization,

(2)

an historical context,

and

(1)

examine the

specifically Chap-

place these developments
(3)

in

formulate an educated ap-

proach to the question of whether or not the recent developments

in this

area represent

its continuing evolution,

or constitute the malignant abuse of the concept of bankruptcy.

1.3

METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE

TI1is paper compiles the evidence currently available
in the public domain through magazine articles, legal texts,
newspapers and trade
research.
data,

journals,

and as such,

No attempt is made to provide new statistical

nor are the facts

given by authors

subjected to primary verification.
the body of facts
11,

is secondary

in this field

However, when comparing

stated by varying writers on Chapter

a certain degree of verification can be assumed when

similiar facts
integrity of

are

stated from different sources.

authors

and editors in the articles given

as reference for this paper is assumed,
necessity for

The

accuracy

is

required,

and as far as the

this assumption is

4

justified.

For example, it is not significant if the number

of asbestos liability suits against Manville Corp is fifteen
thousand, eighteen thousand, or twenty thousand.

The impor-

tant point is the magnitude of the number of such suits,
and the fact that the impact of such a tremendous number
of tort suits on an industrial manufacturer is the same
regardless of the precise number.

In another instance,

the change in work load of airline pilots involved in Continental Airlines' Chapter 11 proceeding is variously stated
by different authors as increasing from fifty-four flying
hours per month to eighty hours per month or to eighty-five
hours

per month.

Both authors may be right,

on the timing of their research,
not matter here.

depending

but the difference does

It is the significance of the change

that is important.

1.4

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

In order to provide an historical context, the development of bankruptcy law is traced from early Roman law
through the revisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in 1978.
Because it is an evolutionary process,
of the

certain principles

law are deemed more important at different epochs,

and the varying emphasis on different principles reflects,
to a

large extent,

example,

the prevailing mood of the times.

For

bankruptcy law in its infancy was intended to be

5

a deterrent against irresponsible financial

dealings by

providing an unmistakable stigma as the sign of business
failure.

Today, society's mood is to provide every opportu-

nity for rehabilitation,
this

current attitude.

and the 1978 revisions reflect
Chapter 11

specifically is the

-

vehicle for court fostered reorganization.

It is intended

to preserve an ongoing business, maintain employment,

and

at the same time protect creditors' interests.
Following the historical

background,

one case

is

given as an example of how Chapter 11 is intended to be
utilized.

This corporation,

Braniff Airlines, made the

wrong decisions at the wrong time,
creditors.
employees,

Notable for

and defaulted to its

its enormous assets,

and magnitude of its debt,

number of

Braniff makes an

interesting case study because of its attempt to reorganize
and survive.
Following Braniff are two cases that represent an
extension of previous
tion.

legal principles of court protec-

Manville Corp represents the utilization of Chapter

11 by an argueably solvent firm as a method to deal with
a mountain of asbestos liability suits.

As such, its reor-

ganization is under scrutiny as a possible abuse of the
bankruptcy system.
Continental Airlines is given as a subsequent case
because of the impact of its use of Chapter 11 to dramatically alter the balance of

labor-management relations.

6

The legal principle used in this case is called the abrogation of existing labor contracts.
importance by one

small

It was given expanded

firm utilizing

in the 1978 Code revision,

liberal changes

and Continental has applied

this principle wholesale in an attempt to significantly
restructure the entire wage level of the airline industry.
Critics claim that this is not simply a creative management
approach to a difficult problem, but more accurately represents a reversal of hard gained labor rights,

and as such

flies in the face of national policy.
The

summary collects various

points

of view from

knowledgeable people in the industries involved and concludes with this author's assessment of the problems previously stated.

1.5

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is currently
undergoing a critical growth period as a
The revision of the Code in 1978,

legal concept.

coupled with liberal

court interpretations of that law and with an economic
recession have thrust the reorganization of troubled businesses

into the business-world spotlight.

Recent develop-

ments are controversial, with the ultimate outcomes subject
to

speculation.

The resolution of these

controversies

will have profound effects on the legal climate in which

(

7

all businesses operate.
of

business

law,

As a component in the evolution

Chapter ll's development is somewhere

between infancy and maturity.

These growing pains are

part of the evolutionary manner in which a civilized society attempts to solve complex problems.

CHAPTER TWO

)

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

Chapter 11 Reorganization is a relatively new legal
concept.

To understand that perspective,

a

look at the

history of straight bankruptcy is necessary.

Bankruptcy

is basically a court supervised liquidation of the estate
of an embarrassed debtor,
creditors

I

petition.

initiated upon his own or his

Bankruptcy's history shows

( 1)

a

development in both voluntary and involuntary proceedings,
( 2)

an expansion of the concept from the individual

smal 1 business to

large businesses,

and

( 3)

a

to

shift in

emphasis from quasi-punishment to rehabilitation.

2.1

ROMAN LAW

The concept of bankruptcy goes as far back as classical

Roman days.

guaranteed,

and

Business success was,

some debtors

never

incurred more obligations

than they could possibly meet.
his creditors from venting in a

as now,

To prevent the wrath of
lawless vendetta, a debtor

could voluntarily appeal to the courts to hold his creditors
at bay long enough to liquidate his estate.
9

This process

10

was called CESSIO BONORUM.1
Creditors in those days as well as today could recognize that a debtor had gotten himself into a position of
not being able to pay,

and could force the debtor into

court involuntarily in a process called MISSIO IN BONA.2
This court action would stop the bankrupt from incurring
even more debts and from watering down the recovery the
creditors hoped to get from his estate.
The development of bankruptcy law in the centuries
following the demise of the Roman Empire centered on three
features:

(1)

that when a debtor owed several creditors,

each of them should participate and share in whatever estate
was available.

This feature of the

law was designed to

preclude one _creditor from getting to the bankrupt first,
taking the entire estate to satisfy his claim, and leaving
nothing for the other creditors.

(2)

The courts will pro-

tect the bankrupt from angry creditors' attempts to resolve
their claims with threats of violence, and (3)
will wear his

shame and carry a

others to avoid financial

stigma as a warning to

irresponsibility.

term bankruptcy stems from BANCA ROTTA,
trading place.
wares

the bankrupt

In fact,

the

meaning a spoiled

A merchant would customarily display his

at his bench in the market place.

Unsatisfied

lsamuel J.M. Donnely et al., Bankruptcy, Arrangements,
and Reorganization (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
1972) p. 503.
2Ibid.

11
creditors would smash his bench and preclude the bankrupt
from doing further business.3
Medieval

Italian city-states adopted these

three

features, and their acceptance as the mainstay of bankruptcy
proceedings spread throughout Europe.

Two Spanish legal

authorities in particular, Baldus and Somoza, are recognized
for codifying and elaborating the basic principles of bankruptcy.

Working independently, both scholars consolidated

the ancient

legal thought on the subject,

offered commen-

taries and recommended court procedures.4

2.2

ENGLISH LAW

Henry VIII

of England brought the concept of bank-

ruptcy to his country in 1543.

However,

he favored only

the involuntary proceedings initiated by creditors.

Volun-

tary petitions were not a part of English law until 1844.
The English contributed to

the evolution of bankruptcy

law by introducing the discharge provision in 1705.
discharge,

the debt was no

longer owed.

Through

Creditors would

have to be satisfied with whatever distribution the court
made of the debtor's estate.

Instead of being required

to continually pay on the old debt through the years,
could begin again with a clean slate -- a
3Ibid., p. 503.
4Ibid., p. 504.

he

fresh start.

12

Lest the courts be regarded as
debtors,

the custom of requiring the wearing of degrading

ing clothes was continued,
the

being too soft on

and the stigma remained.

With

liberalization of discharge provisions that occurred

during the the Twentieth Century,
disappeared.

this stigma has all but

Critics of current bankruptcy law attribute

the rapid rise in consumer bankruptcies that has occurred
in the 1970's to this

feature.

The discharge provision

is however a distinguishing feature between Continental
European countries and English-speaking countries.5

2.3

UNITED STATES LAW

Bankruptcy law in America developed from the English,
or more accurately,
Constitution,

Scottish law.

The framers of the U.S.

in their recognition of the rights of the

common man and small merchant included a clause giving
the Federal government the right to create uniform laws
on the subject,
backwaters of
until
any

although bankruptcy was then still in the

legal thought.

Regardless,

it has not been

the necessities brought on by financial crises that

federal

legislation was

enacted.

Accordingly,

the

development of bankruptcy legislation in this country closely parallels periods of economic depression.

5stefan A. Riesenfeld, Creditors Remedies and Debtors
Protection (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1979), p. 28.

13
Over-speculation in real estate at the end of the
1700's precipitated the enactment of the first American
bankruptcy statute.
tive,

In 1800, a stringent law became effec-

and applied primarily to traders,

and underwriters.
law.

bankers,

It was modeled after existing Scottish

The discharge provision was included,

tary provision was removed.6
in 1803,

brokers

but the volun-

This Federal law was repealed

and it was not until thirty-eight years

that Congress

again acted on the subject.

later

Once again,

over-speculation and the resulting Panic of 1837 was the
impetus for

new legislation.

The bankruptcy law of 1841

expanded the relief provisions in the 1800 law to include
not only mercantile bankruptcies, but also all individual
bankruptcies.

Discharge provisions were liberalized,

voluntary petitions were introduced into Federal
that time.7 Creditor lobbies
provisions,

and

law at

strongly objected to these

and the Law of 1841 was repealed after only

eighteen months of operation.
The economic crisis that immediately followed the
Civil War brought about the
statute, enacted in 1867.

third Federally legislated

This act introduced into American

law the feature of termination of bankruptcy proceedings
by arrangement.

Assent by three-fourths

(in value)

of

the creditors placed the distribution of the assets into
6Ibid., p. 29.
7Ibid., p. 30.

14
the hands of one or more trustees.

An amendment in 1874

reduced the percentage of creditors required for assent
to termination to simply a majority (in value) .8
Current bankruptcy law is regulated by the National
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
1978.

and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of

The 1898 act contained a section called composition

that was designed to deal with larger business failures.
But the reorganization needs required by increasingly more
complex capital

structures quickly outgrew this section.

Out of necessity then,

a concept of equity receiverships

was developed by the courts.9
to corporations

having a

Receiverships were limited

large and continuous business

and to companies involving a significant public interest,
such as railroads and public utilities.
It was

legislation in the 1930's, however,

that de-

veloped the role of reorganization as it is known today.
Rehabilitation provisions were added to the law in 1933,
and the debtor under these provisions was no longer labeled
a bankrupt.10

These provisions were strengthened by the

Chandler Act in 1938 with the additions of Chapter X (Corporate

Reorganizations)

8oonnelly,
tion, p. 506.

and Chapter XI

Bankruptcy,

(Arrangements).

Arrangements and Reorganiza-

9oavid C. Epstein and Myron M. Sheenfeld, Business
Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code (St. Paul: West
Publishing Co., 1979), P:--117.
lORiesenfeld, Creditors Remedies and Debtors Protection, p. 28.

15
As a

reult of the expansion of the provisions for

arrangements, the financially embarrassed debtor with significant assets would most frequently resort to court supervised reorganization rather than to dissolution and distribution.
era

Thii was

precisely the intent of the Depression

law -- to give financially strapped businesses every

chance of continuing to provide employment.

Another signif-

icant contribution of the Chandler Act was a chapter providing relief

for

local governmental units unable to meet

their financial obligations.11
Although this law served its purpose into the 1960's,
the Bankruptcy Law came under mounting criticism for
number of reasons.

A major flaw of the law was the lack

of uniformity of interpretation.
referees

a

Actual practices of the

in bankruptcy varied greatly from district to

district.

Also the mounting load of consumer bankrupt-

cies created increased burdens on the combination of judicial,

investigatory and administrative functions assigned

to referees.
Congress responded to these problems in 1964 by empowering the Supreme Court to resolve conflicting procedural provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.

Congess also estab-

lished a Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States to

"study,

lloonnelly,
tion, p. 508.

analyze,

evaluate and recommend changes

Bankruptcy,

Arrangements and Reorganiza-

16
to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 12
11

The result was the Bank-

ruptcy Reform Act of 1978.

2.4

BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978

The principle changes in the bankruptcy system made
by the new law were:
1. Establishment of bankruptcy courts with comprehensive jurisdiction over all cases governed by Title
11

(Bankruptcy)

and all

cases under Title 11.

civil

suits

relating to

It is this feature that raises

the Constitutionality issue explained below;
2. Strenghtening the

judicial

status

of

the former

trustees in bankruptcy;
3. Launching of an official trustee system as a pilot
project;
4. Consolidation of arrangements under former Chapter
XI

and reorganization under former Chapter X into

a single chapter called Reorganization.

The decision

in a case named U.S. Realty had already blurred the
distinction between the proceedings of these two
chapters;
5. Transfer of rules governing automatic stays
the

into

law and restriction of the rule-making power

of the Supreme Court in bankruptcy matters;
12public Law 9-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).

17
6. Abolition of

the balance sheet test of

as

a

condition for

is

the absence of this

solvency

involuntary proceedings.
feature

that has

It

allowed

the Manville case to remain in Chapter 11.13

2.5

THE JURISDICTION ISSUE

The Constitutionality of the Reform Act of 1978 was
successfully challenged in 1982 in a case named Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.14
This challenge rested on the fact that the issues to be
decided by the bankruptcy judges fell within the judicial
power as defined by Article III of the Constitution, yet
the judges did not possess the guarantees of judicial independence --

life tenure and irreducible salary -- as set

forth by Article III.

This, in effect, halted the jurisdic-

tion of the Bankruptcy Court system,
for

Congress

to decide.

and left the question

The current debate centers on

one of two alternatives -- to limit the bankruptcy judges
to the technical question of bankruptcy itself,

leaving

the resolution of related claims to the ordinary courts,
or to create Article III status for bankruptcy judges. As
yet,

Congress has not resolved the issue, but by a special
13oonnelly, Bankruptcy, p. 509.

14Northern Pipeline Construction Co., v Marathon Pipe
Line Company and the United States, 102~upreme Court Reporter, p. 2858.~-

18
Congressional arrangement the Bankruptcy Court system continues to operate.

2.6

SUMMARY

Bankruptcy
roots

law in the

in _the Constitution.

United States has

its very

But the actual working laws

have always been written as a reaction to an economic crisis.

It was

only after the administrative workload on

the bankruptcy court system became over-burdensome that
the

law was

revised in 1978.

While these revisions were

intended primarily to ease the administration of the bankruptcy system,
ent affect.

in practice it has had an altogether differBy combining related civil suits as well as

the basic question of

insolvency within the bankruptcy

court system, Congress has both subjected the entire bankruptcy proceedure to Constitutional challenges,
opened the door for

and has

innovative uses of Chapter 11,

some

of which may produce results far different from what was
intended.

These

innovative uses of Chapter 11 will be

shown in the specific cases to follow in chapters three
through five.

CHAPTER THREE

BRANIFF AIRLINES

Besides the jurisdictional problem of the bankruptcy
court system,

there is currently debate as to whether the

use of Chapter 11 protection has been extended too far.
A couple of on-going reorganizations

involving Manville

Corp and Continental Airlines are centers of controversy.
Although Manville Corp was considered healthy as an operating concern,

it sought court protection to stall a multi-

tude of asbestos related liability claims.
Airlines,

on the other hand,

Continental

has been accused of using

Chapter 11 as an excuse for wholesale abrogation of union
contracts.
after a

Both these cases will be examined, but only

summary of one case that can be described as the

classic Chapter 11 proceeding.

3.1

FINANCIAL CONDITION

Braniff Airlines,

in 1982,

was

predicament envisioned by the framers

in the financial
of the 1978

law.

After deregulation of the airlines, Braniff promptly opened
new routes in the U.S., Europe and Asia.
20

The entire airline

21
industry typically uses a great deal of leverage, and Braniff was no exception,
debt.

financing this rapid expansion with

But it was not long until the combination of soaring

energy costs, recession, and fare wars resulted in Braniff's
failure to meet its debt obligations.
In 1981, Braniff had a net loss of $160.6 million.
Current assets were exceeded by current liabilities by
$204.8

million.

Redeemable

preferred stock plus

total

liabilities exceeded total assets by $94.4 million.

In

an effort to avoid bankruptcy, Braniff took several strong
financial

measures.

Principle payments to creditors were

delayed from February 1981 to October 1982.

In 1981 em-

ployees accepted a ten percent pay cut, releasing $25 million in working capital during that year.1

These actions

were not enough to keep the company operating.

On May

12, 1982, Braniff filed for Chapter 11.
One of the largest bankruptcies in history, Braniff's
case can be called a classic Chapter 11 situation because
the company simply ran out of cash.

Its operations did

not produce the revenues necessary to support its highly
leveraged position.

At that time Braniff employed over

nine thousand people,

and produced annual revenues of $1.5

billion.
and parts.

It owned sixty-two aircraft,

plus spare engines

These assets form the collateral for the $468

million in secured claims brought to the Court.
lwall Street Journal, January 17, 1983, p. 6.
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3.2

THE PSA DEAL

The Braniff case is also interesting for the way
in which it attempted reorganization.

Nine months after

grounding operations, Bankruptcy Judge John Flowers announced that a tentative arrangement had been worked out between
Braniff and a West Coast airline, PSA.
ment,

Under this arrange-

PSA would obtain title to all sixty-two of Braniff's

airplanes,

secured creditors would receive $250 million,

unsecured creditors would receive ten cents on the dollar,
and preferred and common stockholders would get absolutely
nothing.2

The entity that would remain under the Braniff

name would employ about two hundred people and could anticipate annual

revenues of $20 million.

This deal failed

a

later for these reasons:

For one,

few months

PSA was

not able to win enough wage concessions from unions to
make the new Dallas operation cost effective.
importantly,

But more

this entire plan was put before Judge Flowers

in no more than a two page memorandum.
Companies in Chapter 11 have

long been recognized

to have the right to continue to make operational decisions
without formal Court approval.

This would normally include

leases and sales.

For example, when White Motor Company

was

the Court permitted the sale of the

in Chapter 11,

bulk of White's

truck-manufacturing division to Volvo.

2wall Street Journal, March 17, 1983, p. 3.
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This sale was completed without official creditors'
val.

appro-

PSA claimed that the deal with Braniff was merely

a sale and lease, and not a complete reorganization, requiring detailed reports and creditor approval.
competing airlines were

successful

Creditors and

in challenging this

deal in the Appeals Court.3
An issue involving the ownership of airport landing
slots was also a

factor

in the failure of the PSA deal.

Each airline is assigned landing slots at airports by the
Civil Aeronautics Board.

Braniff's slots were parcelled

out to other companies when it ceased operations.

PSA

and Braniff contended that these assigned slots were assets
of

the corporation and could be assigned to PSA.

decision,

This

originally in favor of PSA, was also overruled,

and PSA gave up.4

3.3

THE HYATT PLAN

A second reorganization attempt,

initiated by

a pilots' group, stands a greater chance of success.
than divesting Braniff of all its flying assts,

Rather
this ar-

rangement provides for the taking over of flying operations
by the Hyatt Hotel group.
hotel

The blending of airline and

interests in the past has had mixed success,
3wall Street Journal, February 19, 1983, p. 6.
4wall Street Journal, March 17, 1983, p. 2.

as Pan
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American Airlines could testify,
new.

Under the Hyatt plan,

but is certainly nothing

thirty of Braniff's 727-200's

would be operational, and 2,500 of Braniff's former employees would be recalled to staff operations,
former headquarters in Dallas.5
support of both creditors'

using Braniff's

This arrangement has the

groups and unions, who granted

the wage concessions necessary to make operations competitive.

American Airlines, who in part was responsible for

Braniff's demise through aggressive competition, has even
cooperated with the Hyatt plan by granting Braniff equal
access to its Sabre reservation system.

American had strong-

ly objected to the PSA deal, and their support of the Hyatt
plan has increased the probability of eventual acceptance.
Getting Braniff airborne again will require the confidence
of both consumers and travel

agents,

and it is thought

that Hyatt's support will make this possible.

3.4

SUMMARY

As one of the Nation's leading passenger airlines,
Braniff provided an important transportation service to
the public prior to airline deregulation,
vided thousands of
will

jobs.

as well as pro-

Its successful reorganization

restore millions of dollars in assets to productive

S 11 The New Braniff: Hyatt Will

World, vol 20: October 1983, p. 65.

Fly It," Air Transport
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use,
for

and will provide continuing employment so necessary
a

stable economy.

Court sponsored reorganization is

the best way to assure this process, and Braniff is correct
to use this approach.

CHAPTER FOUR

MANVILLE CORPORATION

In the Braniff case,

no one will deny that the air-

line is a company that belongs in Chapter 11.

It was clear,

in 1982, that Braniff could not meet its financial obligations,
tor's

and Court action was necessary to protect creditors
interests.

In the case of Manville Corp,

known as Johns-Manville,

formerly

the issue is not at all so clear.

Although apparently solvent by the usual interpretation of

that term,

Manville was faced with potentially

$2 billion worth of asbestos liability claims.

When counted

as a contingent liability against the firm's
in assets,

these ongoing and potential

Manville's management to file
Chapter 11 on August 26,

$1 billion

lawsuits provoked

for Court protection under

1982.

Bankruptcy Judge Burton

R. Lifland ruled against the attempts by creditors and
asbestos victims to deny Manville the use of Chapter 11
on bad-faith grounds.

However,

a controversy remains as

to whether the Manville filing

is effective management

strategy, or a abuse of the system.

29

30

4.1

THE LIABILITY ISSUE

There are
the

two main issues in the Manville case -

liability for

injuries incurred by asbestos workers,

and the operational health of this firm at the time of
Chapter 11 filing.

Neither are clear cut.

leading produGer of asbestos,

As a long-time

Manville supplied this pro-

duct for countless government shipyard contracts for many
years.

Asbestos

is

now recognized as the causal agent

in many forms of cancer and asbestosis, a chronic disabling
lung disease, but it was once a popular construction material

because of

its

fire-retardant properties.

Current

estimates of up to 48,000 workers now have injuries relating
to Manville's product,
filed suit.

and at least 20,000 have already

Manville was faced with an average of five

hundred new suits each month,
found

and its insurance carriers

legal challenges to their liabilities.

for each individual

Settlements

lawsuit averaged $12,000 in 1982,

and

one worker succeeded in netting an award of $2.6 million.1
State workmen's compensation covered most case initially,
but proved to be wholly inadequate for the long-term injuries relating to caused by asbestos.
For years prior to Manville's 1982 filing, an attempt
lstephen Tarnoff, "Manville Considering Individual
Settlements," Business Insurance, October 24, 1983, p.
3.
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was

made to have Congress acknowledge at least partial

governmental
shipyards

responsibility as chief contractor for the

and as

One proposal

a major employer of asbestos workers.

in Congress would set a cut-off date after
(

which no future

liability cases would be accepted.2

would at least put a cap on the number of lawsuits,
thus make that issue more manageable.
factor

This
and

But a complicating

is that asbestos-related injuries may take years

to manifest.

A worker may even be retired before develop-

ing asbestosis.

Workers who develop cancer after the cut-

off would have no redress,
severely

limits

Senator Gary Hart

this

and this obvious disadvantage

proposal's

(D-Colo.)

chance of acceptance.

sponsored a proposal that would

reform the current workmen's compensation system and provide
government participation under a complicated arbitration
formula.3

The AFL-CIO,

on the other hand,

opposes any

attempt to limit liability suits against asbestos manufacturers.
that
the

The American Bar Association supports the position

the

Federal

government should accept some risk in

lawsuits when companies using asbestos materials were

under Federal contracts.4

2 Manvil le May Drive Congress to Action,
Week, September 13, 1982, p. 34.
11

11

3rbid., p. 35.
4wall Street Journal, February 10, 1983, p. 6.

Business
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4.2

THE INSURANCE ISSUE

Another unresolved issue is -- which insurance policy
covers

the workers'

injuries.

Manville carried continuous

insurance coverage throughout the years,

but policies were

written by various insurance companies at different times.
Present insurance companies argue that the injury claims
should be covered by the policy in effect when the exposure
to asbestos took place.
claims

Previous carriers argue that the

should be covered by the policy in effect when the

worker became ill, possibly as much as twenty years later.
The U.S. Court of Appeals has not helped to clarify
the issue, with three different courts handing down conflicting judgements.
Inc.,

A case involving Eagle-Picher Industries,

a Cincinatti-based manufacturer that used to produce

asbestos,

was

appealed to the Supreme Court.

However,

the Supreme Court refused to hear this case.

The High

Court chose not to render a decision as to when insurer's
liability is triggered,
ity

stating that the relevant liabil-

law is already sufficiently settled.5

1980,

As early as

Manville sued Traveler's Insurance Co. and twenty-

seven other
legal costs,

insurers

for

reimbursement

for defense and

which could be as much as $40,000 per case.

Manville also requested $5 billion in damages for the stall
Spaul G. Engle, "Manville's Bankrupt Problems," Industry Week, April 4, 1983, p. 21.

But Not of
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in claims resolution.

In the meantime,

Travelers asked

the California Supreme Court to administer a pool of funds
from insurers to pay defense costs and current claims until
the coverage question is resolved.6

4.3

THE ACCOUNTING ISSUE

Against this backdrop of asbestos litigation Manville
claimed an accounting necessity to "book" contingent liabilities from these suits.

Faced with liabilities of argueably

$2 billion compared with equity of around $1 billion, Manville filed for Chapter 11 court protection,

staying all

\

suits and obligations until a reorganization is approved.
Since the specific insolvency test was deleted in the
1978 changes in the Bankruptcy Code, the courts have recognized the presumption that a company's filing is in good
faith.

Lawyers representing creditors and injured workers

have claimed that this was an abuse of the system, arguing
that Manville is a solvent entity with sufficient resources
to meet its obligations for a

long time,

but they have

not succeeded in removing Manville from Chapter 11.

It

has not been so much the changes brought about by the 1978
revisions

that has

allowed Manville to stay in Chapter

11, but more so the liberal interpretations by the bankruptcy judge as to what constitutes a good-faith filing.
6Business Week, September 13, 1982, p. 35.
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4.4

FINANCIAL CONDITION

Professor Edward I. Altman,
corporate bankruptcies,

a specialist in analyzing

examined Manville's operational

condition between 1972 and 1982, concluding that Manville's
financial
period.

status had been deteriorating steadily over this
This

suggests

that Manville may not have been

the solvent entity that its critics claim.

In 1981, Man-

ville had revenues of $2.2 billion and net earnings of
$60.3 million.
11 a

1982

-

In the year that Manville filed for Chapter

revenues decreased to $1.8 billion, producing

net loss of $97.6 million.

Cash flow experts Robert

Levine and Barre Littel argue that Manville was in trouble
as early as 1979.

That year, Manville earned $115 million

on paper, but excess cash flow was actually negative.
Excess cash flow describes a cash accounting concept
different from accrual accounting.

Actual cash operating

expenses are subtracted from actual cash revenues, with
the depreciation added back,
flow.

the result being excess cash

Normally this would mean that excess cash flow would

be greater than book net income.

However, this was a period

of rising interest expenses, and curiously enough, increased
cash dividends.
million.
In 1981,

In 1978,

In 1980,

Manville paid dividends of $39

excess cash flow was

-$137 million.

although book earnings were over $60 million,

excess cash flow was -$222 million.

In spite of a worsening

35

cash position,

cash dividends of over $70 million were

paid to stockholders.7
In January of 1979, Manville bought Olinkraft,

Inc.,

a forests products company for nearly $600 million, a figure
almost
$300

fifteen

times

earnings.

Of the purchase price,

million was paid in cash,

with the remaining $300

million in convertible preferred stock.

In its financial

statements, Manville counted that preferred stock as equity
of

not debt,

and showed a comfortable debt-to-equity ratio

one to two.

to a

But Manville had to make contributions

sinking fund to convert that preferred stock,

so its

real effect on corporate cash is almost identical to debt.
The debt-to-equity ratio becomes nearly one to one when
that preferred stock is

looked at this way.

One can then

conclude that Manville was in trouble operationally, regardless of the liability issue.8
The filing for Chapter 11 not only created a temporary immunity from lawsuits, but also produced a moratorium
on hundreds of millions of dollars of notes and bonds.
Manville's leading creditors were Prudential Insurance, $68
million;
America,

Morgan Guarantee Trust Co.,
$20 million; Chemical Bank,

$36 million;

Bank of

$20 million; Citibank,

7Barbara Rudolph, "Why Didn't the Credi tors Notice?"
Forbes, October 11, 1982, p. 98.
8Ibid.
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$20 million; and Continental Illinois, $10 million.9
Professor Altman analyzed Manville's risk of bankruptcy using a

formula called Zeta analysis.

identifies key financial
to debt service,

primarily net cash flow

and compares them to historical ranges

in bankruptcy filings.
measures,

ratios,

This technique

Altman combines

five

financial

each one objectively weighed to arrive at an

overall credit score, which becomes the basis for estimating

the

financial

viability of manufacturing firms.10

His conclusion was that Manville was a marginal candidate
for

bankruptcy without

With the contingent

its huge

liabilities

asbestos
added

in,

liabilities.
Manville was

a definate bankruptcy risk.
After filing for Chapter 11, Manville's stock dropped
from $8 to $5 per share, but the corporation has been making
grand attempts

to operate business as usual

whatever consumer confidence is left.
in the asbestos business,

and retain

Although no longer

Manville's building materials

division has established an independent trust fund to honor
liability claims regardless of the outcome of the bankruptcy
proceedings.

9Business Week, September 13, 1982, p. 35.
10Edwin I. Altman, "Exploring the Road to Bankruptcy,"
Journal of Business Strategy, April 1983, p. 37.
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4.5

REORGANIZATION ATTEMPTS

Manville was originally given a deadline of November
1983 to propose a reorganization plan to the Court.
of the complex liability issues involved,
extensions have been granted,
resolved.

at least eight

and the case is not as yet

The plan proposed by Manville's management has

some similiarity to Braniff's original plan.
companies would be created.
all

the

Because

One company

liability but few assets.

Two separate

(Ml)

would have

The other company

(M2)

would contain operations, sending "all cash after operating
expenses"

back to the first to pay the claims.

ity awards would be similiar to workmen's
with an average award around $15,000.
estimate total

Liabil-

compensation,

By being able to

liability more confidently, Manville could

possibly use a technique called reverse insurance, whereby
the total

insurance claim,

say $1 billion, would be paid

by insurers, with Manville paying premiums of $200 million
for five succeeding years.11
The lumping together of claims into a workmen's compensation type system is being resisted by lawyers for claimants and by trial
this

lawyers associations.

They claim that

system would deny an injured worker the right to a

of

llstephen Tarnoff, "Manville Offering Claimants Average
$15,000 Each," Business Insurance, November 7, 1983,

p.

41.
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jury tr ia 1.

They compare the proposed average settlement

of

$15,000

in

just one case.

such a

with the multimillion dollar award obtained

"hostile"

Judge Lifland is reluctant to allow
plan gain approval,

since it would be

sure to encourage years of continuing lawsuits.

Each filing

extension provides Congress with the opportunity to enact
legislation on the issues as well.

4.6

SUMMARY

Manville's

success so far

in using Chapter 11 as a

method for holding off liability claims presents a dangerous precedent for other firms to follow.
with a damaging liability suit,

Any firm,

faced

could declare bankruptcy.

This would strike a profound setback in consumer liability
law.

On the other hand,

if Manville's

situation can be

isolated because of the huge number of lawsuits, Manville's
precedent will not necessarily provide an open door for
irresponsible industrial management.

It also must be taken

into acccount that Manville made an enormous contribution
to the World War

II effort.

At that time it could not

have been forseen that asbestos would harm so many workers.
Congress should acknowledge at least some responsibility
for the damages.
mine a

It will also be up to Congress to deter-

solvency test to insure that the Bankruptcy Court

is not abused.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES

While

the

thrust of Manville's Chapter 11 filing

is the asbestos

liability issue, Continental Airlines has

filed specifically for
labor costs.

the purpose of

lowering wage and

From a management point of

view,

this can

be seen as merely survival by forcing a restructuring of
costs

that grew steadily during pre-deregulation days.

From the union point of view, this can be seen as a breaking
of the union by destroying its bargaining power instead
of a cooperative scale-down of wages.

Of interest here

is the fact that the main tactic used is the abrogation
of union contracts through the bankruptcy courts.
Prior to deregulation in 1978,

increases in pilot,

flight attendant, and machinist wages could be successfully
passed on to customers.

But with the post-deregulation

scramble for passenger business and the fare-wars sparked
by Pan Am's

$99 tickets,

cost

airlines began

trunk

Continental and the other highlosing millions

of dollars.

Between June 1979 and June 1983, Continental alone lost
$472 million.

During this period pilots annual wages aver-

aged $73,000.

The base pay for flight attendants averaged
40

I
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$28,000, and machinists annual wages averaged $33,000.1

5.1

CONTINENTAL'S MANAGEMENT

Although the current precedent for
11

using Chapter

to abrogate union contracts was

set by a relatively

small New Jersey firm named Bildisco,

the wholesale expan-

sion of this

tactic to restructure the airline industry's

wage level is attributable to the management style of Continental's chairman, Mr. Francisco Lorenzo.
Mr.

Lorenzo got his

start in the airline industry

by forming a financial advisory firm with a Harvard Business

School

financial

classmate,

team,

Mr.

Robert Carney.

in 1969 the pair formed Jet Capital Corp,

and raised $1.5 million in a
1972,

small public offering.

Jet Capital bought control of Texas

Airlines,

a

Primarily a

International

regional carrier precariously in debt.

winning CAB approval
"peanut" fares,

to

In

introduce half-price,

After

off-peak

Mr Lorenzo restructured Texas Internation-

al's debt and revamped the fleet.

It earned a profit of

$13 million in 1978.2
Ironically,
National

Airlines

it was an unsuccessful takeover bid for
that gave Lorenzo's

airline the cash

l continental Has a Union on the Run," Business Week,
September 5, 1983, p. 34.
11

2Roy Rowan, "An Airline Boss Attacks Sky-High Wages,"
Fortune, January 9, 1984, p. 72.
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it needed to expand.

Pan American eventually won out in

the aggressive bidding for National stock, but in the process Texas

International earned a profit of $47 million

from the sale of National stock.
Texas Air Corp,

an airline holding company now in a posi-

tion to branch out.
against

unions

Texas International became

In 1980, Mr Lorenzo launched his attack

by starting the

nonunion New York Air.

This airline was created to challenge Eastern's monopoly
in the Boston-Washington corridor.
during 1983.

In the meantime,

control of Continental.
January 1984,
Air.

It became profitable

Texas Air was fighting for

It succeeded in June 1982.

By

Jet Capital owned sixteen percent of Texas

Texas Air in turn owned ninety-one percent of Conti-

nental and sixty-four percent of New York Air.3
During that three year period when Texas Air was
fighting for control of Continental, the latter's financial
condition was deteriorating steadily.

A chronic cash shor-

tage required Continental to take drastic measures to maintain working capital.
Continental

Between April 1982 and January 1984,

sold off $109 million in assets,

million through debt and equity financing,
$80 million in cash infusions from Texas Air.4

3Ibid.
4Ibid.

raised $143
and accepted
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5.3

PRE-CHAPTER 11 ACTIONS

Upon taking control of Continental~ Mr. Lorenzo immediately began to attack the high wage structure.
he had extracted $100

Even though

million worth of concessions from

Continental's pilots, had laid off more than 3,500 employees
and had trimmed operations by twelve percent, Lorenzo placed
an ultimatum before the unions in September 1983 -

either

accept a new employee stock ownership plan or face bankruptcy.

He asked for

a

voluntary reduction in

labor costs

of $150 million. In return he offered a twenty-five percent
employee
director.
of
The

a

share of future profits,
The offer was

thirty-five

percent

and an employee-elected

sweetemed by a
employee

Texas Air offer

ownership position.

International Machinists Union struck,

and the stock-

sharing and wage reduction program was rejected.5

On Septem-

ber 24, 1983, Continental filed for Chapter 11.
By preparing for

the Chapter 11 filing in advance,

Continental ceased operations for a mere three days before
it began flying again.

The company had at least $50 million

in cash at the time of the filing,
breaking pilots,
provisions of

enough to hire strike-

machinists and ticket agents.

its Chapter 11 filing,

Under the

Continental was able

5Erwin J. Bulban, "Continental Regroups Under Chapter
11," Aviation Week and Space Tenhnology, October 10, 1983,
p. 33.
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to resume

operations with several

significant changes.

Domestic service was reduced to twenty-five cities compared
with seventy-eight prior to shutdown, with 118 daily departures instead of 540 previously, and 11.8 million available
seat-miles instead of 42.6 million.
was

The number of employees

reduced from 12,000 to 4,200, with recalled personnel

accepting wage cuts of fifty percent.

Executives and other

management personnel salaries were reduced by fifteen percent, and office staff was cut sixty-five percent.6
The pilots that continued to fly through the strike
accepted an increase in flying hours from fifty-four to
eighty,

and a cut in wages to $43,000.

accepted a

new $15,000 wage base.

Mr.

Flight attendants
Lorenzo himself

reduced his own compensation from $267,000 in 1982 to the
same wage as

pilots.

He promised to stay at that wage

until the airline becomes profitable.7
The success of these cost reduction techniques is
being closely observed by airlines in similiar positions,
namely Eastern and American.
force

unilateral

concessions

Mr.

Lorenzo's ability to

on the union has suddenly

added new clout to airline management's bargaining position
throughout the industry.

6rbid.
7 America a Airlines October 1, 1983, p. 68.
11

1

A New Chapter," Economist,
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5.4

THE BILDISCO PRECEDENT

As mentioned before,
with the Bildisco case.

all this seems to have started
In 1980, Bildisco was a hundred

person manufacturer and distributor of building supplies.
It had only a few months before filing for Chapter 11 signed
a

labor contract for

Local

408

its thirty drivers with Teamsters

in New Jersey.

Because of financial problems,

Bildisco left the distribution side of its business.

This

firm retained only two employees doing Teamster-like work.
The Bankruptcy Court gave Bildisco approval
the recently signed union contract,

to abrogate

reducing its Teamster

wages from $18 per hour to $12 per hour.8
Prior to

the

1978

changes

in the bankruptcy law,

abrogation of labor contracts was allowed only if the employer proved that bankruptcy and dissolution were imminent
if extraordinary relief was not available.

The union posi-

tion is well stated by Ken Nowak, Teamster Local 408
attorney:
"We are not saying that bankruptcy courts can't
abrogate labor contracts, but we are saying that Congress has provided all sorts of protection for labor
contracts that companies are evidently circumventing
through innovative uses of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.9

8 Bankruptcies That Slash Labor Costs," Industry Week,
October 17, 1983, p. 19.
11

9Ibid., p. 10.
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5.5

SUMMARY

Continental Airlines,

like other large trunk airlines

prior to deregulation, had allowed wages to climb to levels
that became economically unjustifyable when competition
hit the airlines.

The winnowing process of free enterprise

dictated that this

airline either restructure its wage

levels significantly,

or face dissolution.

Continental's

bankruptcy would have a disasterous impact on the industry
and on employment in general.

It takes a heavy hand to

beat back hard won union momentum in achieving increased
wage levels for union members,
the clout for
dissolution.

and Chapter 11 has provided

Continental's management to use to avoid
But it is the unilateral heavy-handedness

that concerns people involved with labor-management issues.
to

Once again Congessional action will be required

limit the right of employers to utilize Chapter 11 to

abrogate union contracts.
Because of the Bankruptcy Court's liberal interpretation of the right of management to abrogate union contracts,
Chapter 11 may be temporarily effective in restructuring
the airline industry's wage scale.

However,

Congress has

traditionally supported the collective bargaining process.
Indeed,

legislation has already been introduced to assure

that collective bargaining is supported in the courts.

CHAPTER SIX

----------:---------------------

---

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This is a time of transition for the entire bankruptcy
court system.

At the same time the

jurisdiction of the

bankruptcy judges is under challenge, the use of Chapter 11
in innovative ways

is expanding.

to protect creditor's

interests,

By using laws designed
corporations have been

able to forestall enormous liability suits, and force unilateral wage scales
contracts.

in the place of collectively bargained

Is this creative management or is it an abuse

of the system?

Specialists in this area have voiced these

comments:

Ray Rodgers, director of Corporate Campaign Inc,
a 1 abor consul ting firm:
"In some respects, Frank
Lorenzo is doing for management what unions should
be doing for labor - thinking up new strategies to
deal with labor-management problems.
There are strategies that labor and public interest groups can use
to counter abuse of bankruptcy proceedings. 11 1
Henry A. Duffy, president of the Airline Pilots
Association:
"If Continental is successful in imposing
its wages and working conditions, that is going to be
a role model for other airlines to follow.
We are going
to make Chapter 11 so difficult and so expensive that no

l Lorenzo Battles to Keep His Airline Aloft," Business
Week, October 17, 1983, p. 42.
11
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company can use it to slide out of its labor contracts
so easily. 2
11

Rep. George Miller (D-Calif.), chairman of the
House Labor Standards Subcommittee:
"Recent bankruptcy
proceedings are
undermining the
foundation of labormanagement relations.
Legislation will be introduced
to assure fairness in industrial relations. 3
11

Earnest J. Nagy, chairman and CEO of Riblet
Corp:
"The airline industry is sick and has to
thing, and if Chapter 11 is one of the vehicles
again, then I'm all for it. I'm not anti-union,
Continental can reorganize under Chapter 11
down their fat and lower their wages, then it's
good thing. 4

Products
do someget well
but if
and cut
a pretty

11

Felix Rohatyn, head investment banker with Lazard
Freres:
"In a bankruptcy case, al 1 major participants
must make sacrifices for the company to survive. I
would like to see a business-labor-government board
that would look at such industrial problems as they
evolve and develop proposals. 5
11

Herman Glatt, chairman of the Business Bankruptcy
Committee of the American Bar Association:
"The entire
thing is subject to mass confusion.
The issue of union
contracts has distracted many people from the more
critical need of preserving working bankruptcy courts. 6
11

2James Ott, "Unions
Attack
Continental,
Eastern
Moves," Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 10,
1983, p. 12.
3Industry Week, October 17, 1983, p. 20.
4Ibid.
5Josh Martin, "The Various Uses of the Bankruptcy
Laws," Financial World, December 31, 1983, p. 44.
6Ibid.
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The changes to the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 appear
to have created an open door to the use of Chapter 11 in
innovative and controversial ways.
situation,

with all

the

above

But this is a temporary
issues before Congress.

Eventually Congress will resolve the jurisdictional issue.
Congress is also

likely to

limit the more controversial

thrusts made by management in the use of Chapter 11.
will

This

probably be resolved with a re-introduction of some

form of a solvency test, as well as with legislation limiting the wholesale abrogation of union contracts.

Possibly

there will be mandated arbitration in future cases similiar
to Continental.
These developments represent a growth spurt in the
evolutionary development of bankruptcy
a

period of crisis,

but in that crisis,

law.
the

It is also
issues are

crystalizing,

providing Congress with the opportunity to

resolve them.

The end result will be, no doubt, a matura-

tion of bankruptcy law.

'
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